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Abstract: This paper investigates the approaches to the utilitarian use of  
play and games in the West and in China. In order to do so, starting 
from examples pertaining to both cultures, it draws a map of  the dif-
ferent ideologies of  play, ranging from the idea that play is something 
silly and unimportant, to the more hostile reactions towards games 
portrayed as dangerous, to the enthusiastic idea — linked to gamifica-
tion — of  using play in every situation in order to boost engagement 
and participation. These ideologies are then situated around a semi-
otic square based on their attitude towards play and it is suggested 
that a fourth position may exist, less easy to handle but possibly more 
objective.
Keywords: Gamification; game–based learning; moral panic; mass–shoo-
ting; play; video games; ideology
Introduction
Gamification, a buzzword introduced in the context of  marketing in 
2008, is nowadays a global phenomenon: studied, tested and exploit-
1. This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 re-




ed all around the World. Gamification can be defined as the attempt 
to design experiences or products so that they are more “game–like” 
to make them more attractive and engaging. To this end several 
strategies exist, some dealing with the implementation of  game ele-
ments in non–game systems (Deterding et al., 2011), others focusing 
on the user–experience (Huotari, Hamari, 2015) or underlining the 
importance of  fun or excitement (Werbach, Hunter, 2012; McGoni-
gal, 2011).
In either case, the concept of  gamification is rooted, more or less 
consciously, in a specific, transcultural, ideology of  play. In this paper I 
will attempt to situate gamification in its ideological background by 
outlining the main ideologies that surround play and its relationship 
with society. This should allow, on the one hand, a better under-
standing of  the phenomenon of  gamification, contextualised as a 
larger cross–cultural trend and, on the other hand, the postulation 
of  a more objective perspective on the possibility of  “taming” and 
using play for non–playful purposes.
1. From play to gamification: The ludicisation of culture
The relevance of  play is not something new. Play is a fundamental 
aspect of  the life and development both of  human and non–human 
animals. The Greek philosopher Plato, in the second book of  Laws, 
indicated as the first principle of  play the desire of  the younglings 
to leap about and make a noise, even though they were capable of  
staying still and being silent. More recently, Gregory Bateson (1956) 
claimed that every species of  vertebrate engages in play, and that in 
fact, this is one of  the most sophisticated activities undertaken by 
several of  them. The ability to metacommunicate one’s playful inten-
tion — to “tell” other animals that their following actions should 
not be interpreted as a threat, but as playful — is not a trivial matter.
Play, then, finds its fundamental importance also in human cul-
ture. Huizinga (1949), the father of  modern studies on play, identifies 
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several areas of  culture that make very large use of  play principles, 
mentioning, among others, religion, rituals and warfare. Bakhtin, in 
his study of  Rabelais and of  the carnivalesque (1988), underlines the 
fundamental role of  play in appeasing social tensions. Carnivals al-
low participants, within a specific and rigid frame, to playfully chal-
lenge crucial social norms, permitting the members of  a society to 
play out these tensions, without really endangering the social fabric 
of  their society. Roger Caillois (1967), moreover, traces connections 
between his “forms of  play” and phenomena such as drug addiction 
or the stock market. The list of  works pointing out the importance 
of  play in human cultures could very easily go on.
Nevertheless, in the last few decades, something has changed. 
Play and games — in particular digital games — have acquired a 
cultural prominence that seems to be unprecedented. If  we look at 
it from a merely economic perspective, we can see that the Game 
Industry has become the fourth biggest entertainment industry on 
the planet, surpassing the revenues of  the Film Industry3. To give an 
example, Rockstar’s game Grand Theft Auto V has been the fastest–
selling entertainment product in history4, earning $800 million in its 
first day and $1 billion in its first three days, largely surpassing any 
blockbuster. This is a global trend: the top nations in terms of  esti-
mated video game revenues in 2018 were China ($37 B), the United 
States ($30B) and Japan and the EU (both circa $19B)5.
The economic success of  digital games is just a part of  a larger 
cultural shift: that of  the ludicisation of  culture. This term, intro-
duced by Bonenfant and Genvo (2014), along with others such as 
“ludification” or “gamification of  culture”, indicates the growing 
importance and prestige of  play in contemporary culture. In semiot-
3. The top three most lucrative entertainment industries remain, as of  2015, casi-







ic terms it can be described as a movement of  play towards the cen-
tre of  the semiosphere (Thibault, 2016). Play is a modelling system 
that has always been common to all semiospheres, but nowadays, 
due to several factors, both social and technological (see, e.g., Orto-
leva, 2012), is acquiring an unprecedented centrality. 
This repositioning of  play within the semiosphere entails a higher 
modelling ability, both in its descriptive and prescriptive dimension. 
On the one hand, then, play and games become a metalanguage 
used to describe other portions of  the semiosphere. We can think 
of  terms like “winners” and “losers”, that have become mainstream, 
but also of  the discourses around politics or the economy, or ways 
of  self–description (see Idone Cassone, 2017). On the other hand, 
games also become prescriptive: there is a general idea that things 
would be “better” if  they were more game–like — it is the basis of  
the idea of  gamification.
The fact that play has moved towards the centre of  the semio-
sphere, however, does not mean that we play more than in the past, 
or that play was somewhat less crucial in past eras. Ludicisation has 
to do with the prestige with which play is invested within a certain 
culture. In other words, play has always been necessary for human 
life, but today we recognise in it something so prestigious that we 
tend to understand and shape according to its rules also things that 
are not playful at all.
In several cultures, the situation has often been radically differ-
ent. Due to the difficulty of  defining play, it has often been defined 
in opposition to things such as “work” or “seriousness” (Bateson, 
1956), despite the fact that play can be extremely serious, and that 
people can make a living out of  it. Play has often been dismissed as 
something silly and unimportant, innocuous and not worthy of  at-
tention. Play has been relegated to the outskirts of  the semiosphere, 
despite its importance, and associated with children, savages, or oth-
er groups of  “peripheral”6 people. This is a first ideology of  play that, 
6. Using, again, Lotman’s terminology.
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even though it is slowly being replaced by others, is still well repre-
sented across different cultures and environments.
2. Hostility
The fact that games are now at the centre of  the semiosphere also 
accounts for the need for new metalanguages to discuss it. The birth 
of  disciplines such as Game Studies or of  branches like the semiotics 
of  games accounts for this need to “talk” about games, to under-
stand them. At the same time, in parallel with its growing economic 
importance, the Power has also started to develop languages and 
regulations in regard to games.
Video game content rating systems have started to be created 
across the world, generally setting age limits for the use of  certain 
products. In Europe, for example, since 2003 there has beens the 
Pan European Game Information (PEGI) system. China also has nu-
merous regulations. Yingrong Chen (2018) estimates that there are 
94 regulation at national level and 2000 at local level (including also 
rules regarding lotteries and other forms of  play). These regulations 
cover a variety of  topics, including copyright, in–game transactions, 
the approval of  game content — with rules to protect the youth 
from possibly dangerous content (addiction, porn, violence) — but 
also regulations regarding the role of  games in society — that is, 
games have to be coherent with the national ideology and not of-
fend the national image. Most of  these regulations arise from prac-
tical and sensible concerns. Nevertheless, in others it is easy to spot 
traces of  a form of  distrust towards play that runs deep in human 
culture. 
And that is because playfulness is scary. It is something power-
ful and uncontrollable. It questions the social order of  everyday life, 
proposing new and alternative meanings to objects and spaces. For 
this reason, every culture tries to erect more or less strict boundaries 
around play. If  banishing play is probably impossible, history is full 
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of  attempts to regulate it, to contain its disruptive force within spe-
cific boundaries of  time or space — let us think, again, of  Bakhtin’s 
work on carnival.
One of  the fiercest critics of  play in history has often been re-
ligion. Play is sometimes perceived as desecrating, and its ability to 
evoke passions and to challenge the traditional meaning of  things 
makes it, in some cases, an enemy of  religions. In a paper entitled 
La pallavolo sacra (2016), Leone presented an interesting overview of  
the attitude of  Abrahamic religions — especially Christianity and 
Islam — towards play, an attitude that often turned into open con-
demnation. Let us think of  the “falò delle vanità” (bonfires of  the 
vanities), which took place in Italy in the 15th century and involved 
the burning of  game sets and playing cards because they were con-
sidered sinful.
Distrust and hostility towards games has continued until mod-
ern days, and new forms of  play are often met with scepticism and 
fear. This happened, for example, with role–playing games (RPG) 
in the 1980s. Dungeon and Dragons was the first RPG ever creat-
ed and faced a staggering amount of  hostility. Published in 1973, it 
proposed a set of  rules based on fantasy, pen and paper, in which 
each player impersonates a magical character (an elf  wizard, a war-
rior dwarf  and so on) and describes to the other players his or her 
character’s behaviour. Although it may seem difficult to find a more 
innocuous form of  play than this form of  collective story–telling, 
the game encountered a heated wave of  moral panic. 
The wave was born in response to the suicide of  two 16–year–
old Americans, James Dallas Egbert III and Irving Bink Pulling II, 
who killed themselves respectively in 1980 and 1982. Despite the 
presence of  many psychological and social factors that potentially 
explained their gesture — chronic depression, drug abuse, bullying 
— the American media hypothesized that one of  the main factors 
that had led them to suicide was their being D&D players (Waldron, 
2005). This convinced Patricia Pulling, Irving’s mother, to denounce 
the company that produced the game — the TSR (“Tactical Stud-
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ies Rules”) — as responsible for the death of  her son. She lost the 
trial in 1984, and subsequently founded, together with psychiatrist 
Thomas Radecki, an organization named Bothered About Dungeons 
and Dragons (B.A.D.D.) to lobby against the game, finding support 
especially in the area of  Christian fundamentalism. The game was 
accused of  being the result of  a demonic influence and connected 
to other phenomena perceived as threatening and satanic like Heavy 
Metal music.
The campaigns and lobbying against role–playing games carried 
out by B.A.D.D. continued for about a decade, with intermittent suc-
cess, and can be articulated in three successive stages (ibidem). Initial-
ly the D&D players were accused of  using the game to launch real 
curses on their peers, parents and teachers. This accusation was at the 
centre of  Pulling’s complaint against TSR in which her son’s death 
was imputed to a curse that was (supposedly) thrown at him during 
the game. The second phase, begun in the mid–eighties, was char-
acterized by an attempt to move more rational accusations against 
the game, mainly related to the influence it could have on its players. 
These allegations were based on the belief  still widespread, but never 
proven, that the game can affect the players in a subtle and harmful 
way and therefore its contents should be carefully monitored. The 
third and final phase of  the moral panic was centered on the idea that 
D&D could be a recruitment tool for Satanists and pagans and that 
therefore it would lead players to perform immoral or violent acts.
At first the arguments brought by the B.A.D.D. found fertile 
ground within the Christian and Republican communities in Amer-
ica. The game was banned in many schools and by many families, 
while several members of  the clergy discouraged the use of  the 
game. Some films dedicated to the alleged nefarious consequences 
of  the game were produced in those years: the most famous is prob-
ably Mazes and Monsters (Stern, 1982), where a young Tom Hanks 
tries to jump off  one of  the twin towers of  the World Trade Center 
after losing the ability to distinguish between his identity and that of  
his character.
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The panic surrounding the role–playing games, however, soon 
began to lose its grip. The fact that all legal actions taken or support-
ed by the B.A.D.D. proved to be a failure eroded the image and ar-
guments of  opponents of  role–playing games. Furthermore, several 
studies (for example Simón, 1987; DeRenard, Klein, 1990) proved 
that there are no significant correlations between role–play, aliena-
tion and emotional instability. It would seem, on the contrary, that 
the players were statistically less likely to succumb to violence and 
depression than non–players (Waldrop, 2005). On Pulling’s death 
in 1992, the B.A.D.D. was discontinued and the moral panic finally 
ended. Or, more probably, it found a new target and began to con-
centrate on video games.
Digital games have also been accused of  several nefarious effects 
on the young. The most persistent accusation is that video games 
might be in some way related to mass shootings. Even if  the scien-
tific literature seems to indicate otherwise (Markey et al., 2015), at 
almost every mass–shooting in the United States the point has been 
made that the killer was a gamer and that games were probably in-
volved in his actions. This has also happened in Europe: in Germany, 
for example, after the Winnenden school shooting in March 2009, 
many accusations were made against violent video games. In that 
case the German rating system for video games was used to vol-
untarily restrict sales of  certain video games by stores: the German 
retailer Galeria Kauf hof  removed all video games rated 18+ from 
its shelves.
Some digital games have also been accused of  being “addictive” or 
“poisonous” for the young. This has been the case with Arena of  Val-
or (or Honor of  Kings, in Chinese 傳說對決) a multiplayer online battle 
arena for smartphones developed and published in 2015 by Chinese 
tech giant Tencent Games. It is a rather interesting game for several 
reasons. First of  all, with an estimated 200 million monthly players, 
Honor of  Kings might well be the biggest game in the World, de-
spite its mild success in the West. Secondly, it is estimated that more 
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than 50% of  its players in China are females7, especially thanks to the 
integration of  the game with WeChat, the most widely used instant 
messaging App in China, also developed by Tencent. Other MOBA 
games have typically a much lower percentage of  female players, 
a maximum of  around 35%. Nevertheless, in 2017 a commentary 
in the People’s Daily newspaper, the mouthpiece of  the Chinese 
Communist Party, described Arena of  Valor as being “poison” and 
a “drug” that was harming Chinese teenagers. Its success and abili-
ty to engage the youth were portrayed as somewhat unnatural and 
dangerous. This statement alone cost Tencent 17 billion dollars8, 5% 
of  its total value, because of  worried investors.
Finally, it is not unusual that games using new technologies are 
met with strong distrust or hostility. The first AR (augmented real-
ity) game to enjoy real success, Ninatic’s Pokémon Go, was greeted 
with rather apocalyptical tones and ferocious criticism. In Europe 
it caused great debates about its possible harmfulness: players were 
often associated with zombies and every news item of  players get-
ting hit by a car while playing the game became immediately viral. 
In China the game was subjected to an evaluation of  potential se-
curity and safety risks: the authorities were concerned about pos-
sible threats to geographical information security. In other words, 
they were concerned that the meaning proposed by the game would 
overshadow that of  reality, encouraging players to wander in pro-
hibited places in their Pokémon hunt.
The diffidence towards play, therefore, gives birth to a second 
ideology, one that sees play as something dangerous, destructive, a 
menace to the social order and to the integrity of  our symbolic uni-
verse. Play is criticised as capable of  destroying meaning, of  making 
players lose their identities or the sense of  their surroundings. The 






being reinforced, to prevent playfulness from invading reality and 
bringing with it insanity and confusion.
3. Enthusiasm
Interestingly enough, a radically different attitude towards play runs 
parallel to that based on distrust: a utilitarian one. Attempts to en-
thusiastically harness play’s might can be found throughout history. 
From Rome’s panem et circenses, to the Olympics, to the works of  
educators and psychologists such as Montessori or Piaget, play has 
been seen as a tool that can be used for creating social stability and 
healthy individuals.
In the last decade, this tendency became even stronger, as new 
concepts arose such as gamification and game–based learning — i.e. 
the creation of  educational activities that make use of  full–fledged 
games in order to transfer knowledge. Gamification and game–based 
learning both have to be understood as an effect of  ludicisation: as 
play has a new centrality in the semiosphere, its modelling ability 
increases, and its prestige encourages people to try to exploit it.
The use of  games or gamified activities for serious purposes has 
been adopted by various agents, and some of  them might seem un-
expected. Several national armies, for example, use games or gami-
fied systems. “Propaganda games” financed with public money have 
been developed in some countries. Already in 2002, for example, 
the US Army published America’s Army, a game meant to acquaint 
US citizens with the Army itself. Similarly, the Communist Party 
of  China is sponsoring the development of  a game — not released 
yet — entitled Chinese Heroes which is intended to infuse patriotism 
in the players. 
Several games and gamified applications have also been designed 
for creating a better society, at least in the intentions of  their devel-
opers. One rather famous case within gamification studies is Jane 
McGonigal’s Superbetter. It is a free–to–use application meant to help 
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people suffering from traumas, illness and injuries by gamifying 
their recovery experience. With the help of  the application, users 
can select some “bad guys” (such as the “sticky chair” symbolising 
sedentariness), use some “power ups” (like drinking a glass of  wa-
ter), complete daily challenges (going out for a walk, taking some 
time to be grateful about something and similar) and earn points 
and levels in the meantime. It is a handbook case of  gamification, 
and it is driven by a clear ideological and political objective: that of  
using games to make the World a better place (McGonigal, 2011).
In China, national hero Lei Feng has been used in several games 
as an example to follow to be better citizens and improve society. 
Learning from Lei Feng, for example, is the title of  a game that finds 
its place in the Museum of  Shanghai (Chen, 2018). Aimed at prima-
ry school students, it tasks them with collecting trash and keeping 
the city clean. In March 2006, furthermore, a Chinese organization 
released an online game called Learn From Lei Feng Online (学雷锋) in 
which the player has to perform good deeds, fight spies and so on, in 
order to meet Chinese leader Mao Zedong.
Finally, in the West there has also been a real buzz about the Chi-
nese government’s intention to create a social credit system (社会信
用体系) using big data to assess how “good” a citizen is (Botsman, 
2017). Most of  the accounts have been in some measure incorrect, 
often confusing the project with Sesame Credit (which instead is a 
private credit scoring application and loyalty program by Alibaba 
Group) or basing their arguments primarily on speculation about 
what might happen. Nevertheless, while we wait for the implemen-
tation of  the social credit system in 2020, we can point out that, 
from the preliminary descriptions, it might indeed seem a way of  
gamifying loyalty to the State — or to the Government.
Despite the enthusiasm in its implementation, however, the ac-
tual effectiveness of  gamification is still debated. An interesting 
study (Hamari et al., 2014) proposes a meta–analysis showing that 
gamification is not always the most effective choice for creating en-
gagement: in fact, its efficacy depends a great deal on the users and 
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on the context of  its use. Moreover, another criticism comes from 
a rather funny article entitled Games against health (Linehan et alii 
2015). The paper is a parody of  the “Games for Health” movement 
and proposes the realization of  games having detrimental effects on 
their players’ health: games that reward them when they eat snacks 
or sit for hours in front of  the screen. The authors, in this way, are 
trying to make the point that several gamification attempts are in 
fact highly manipulative, patronizing and top down: the designers 
just know what is best for their players and they try to trick them 
into doing it. In this way, furthermore, the activities themselves are 
less and less playful, the gamification consisting merely in adding a 
superficial game–like layer onto the activity, based on behaviourist 
theories.
The ideology of  play at the basis of  gamification, then, appears 
as narrow as the one that sees play mainly as a danger. Games are 
presented as a sort of  panacea, using their current prestige for claims 
that are not supported by evidence. 
Conclusions: a map of play ideologies
This brings us back to the opening question of  this paper: is it really 
possible to “tame” play, to exploit it in a safe and efficient way? In 
order to answer this question, let us try to map the different ideas 
and ideologies of  play that we have encountered until now. To do so, 
let us start from a basic opposition: constructive vs destructive. We 
have seen that play can be seen both as a way of  creating meaning 
and engagement, and as something that destroys the meaning of  
everyday life and endangers our symbolic universe. 
This opposition can be used as a base to build a semiotic square, 
as seen in Fig. 1.
The idea of  play being at the same time non destructive and non 
constructive gives birth to an ideology that sees play as “neutral”. It is 
the first ideology that we encountered, the one that dismisses play as 
Figure 1.  
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something silly or childish, opposed to work and to seriousness. An 
ideology certainly weakened by the movement of  play towards the 
center of  the semiosphere, but still present in contemporary society.
If, on the other hand, play is seen as something destructive and non 
constructive, then it is portrayed as something “detrimental”. This is 
the ideology of  distrust and hostility, generating moral panic around 
different forms of  play perceived as endangering the meaning of  
everyday life, without offering any valuable alternative.
On the opposite side, there is play regarded as something both 
constructive and non destructive, a utopian view of  play seen as purely 
“beneficial”. Gamification and game–based learning are rooted in 
this ideology, that often propounds an uncritical and unjustified, en-
thusiastic use of  games and gamification.
There is, however, a fourth possibility: that of  recognizing that 
play can be, at the same time, constructive and destructive. In other 
words, anideology that accepts the fact that playfulness is “ambigu-
ous”, it is something that can be tamed and controlled but only up 
to a certain point. Play cannot be seen (only) as a chthonian and de-
structive force to be contained, while, on the other hand, excessive 
control will destroy the freedom that lies at the heart of  a playful 
behavior (Thibault, 2016). Play, then, has to be wild, indeterminate, 
uncontainable. It can be directed, but never strictly controlled, oth-
erwise we will be left with a mere husk of  rules and game elements 
that will not have anything playful inside it any more. 
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Interestingly enough, the ambiguity of  play is also central in Brian 
Sutton–Smith’s works (1997). Sutton–Smith, in his book dedicated to 
the topic, describes the seven rhetorics of  play: distinct ways in which 
play has been understood and described. He distinguishes between 
the rhetorics of  play as fate (articulated in the various theories of  luck 
and chance, but also in the idea of  gods controlling and playing with 
human life), play as power (that usually draws links to warfare, athlet-
ics, competitions and contests), play as identity (when used to confirm 
communal identities through rituals and celebrations), play as frivolity 
(that concentrates on the subversive and carnivalesque potentials of  
play), play as progress (that sees in play a path towards growth and evo-
lution, and a key to learning for children and animals), play as the im-
aginary (that relates play to art and insists on its separation from reali-
ty) and finally, play as the self (focusing on the fun and relaxing features 
of  these activities and on the balance between skills and challenges 
that they imply). This distinction should not be seen as in competition 
with our map of  the ideologies of  play, but as complementary to it. 
The seven rhetorics can be articulated according to our four ideolo-
gies and vice versa. The rhetoric of  play as fate, for example, could 
be used to describe play as a consolation for the disappointed (play as 
neutral), as an addictive vice (play as detrimental) or as a positive take 
on life, in a “fortune favours the brave” sort of  way (play as benefi-
cial). Similarly play as power could be described as a mere reflection 
of  “real–life struggles” (play as neutral), as a way of  provoking heated 
and mindless competition (play as detrimental) or as a way of  chal-
lenging players to exit their comfort zone and grow (play as benefi-
cial). This operation could be repeated for every one of  the rhetorics 
highlighted by Sutton–Smith. The result would be a complex net, in 
which every position consists in a possible idea of  play. The aim of  this 
paper, then, is to urge that we should not limit our understanding of  
play to one of  these positions, nor to one of  the opposed ideologies 
of  play (detrimental vs beneficial), but to keep in mind that play is 
something complex, paradoxical and variable enough to contain all 
of  them.
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